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Abstract 
Human rights are today criticized as not compatible with different cultural values and the debate has circulated 
around Asian values and Islamic values as in dichotomy with human rights as universal ethics (Ignatieff, 2003). 
The theoretical dichotomy between universality and particularity is questioned pragmatically in this paper 
through a historical study. The working process of drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
in 1946-48, which included thousands of people, is explored as a cosmopolitan space in which individuals from 
different cultural contexts met to negotiate human rights through cultural narratives. The process where 
particular values were negotiated with universal notion on human rights resulted in a common proclamation 
(UDHR) without a common philosophical or ideological ground. This paper puts forth a thesis that human rights 
discourse can work as a cosmopolitan space, in which particular value systems meet in processes characterized 
by conflict and cohesion. Hence human rights can be understood as a master narrative compatible with different 
conflicting cultural narratives (Gibson & Somers, 1994). 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The tension between particularity and universality has been articulated within 
cosmopolitanism in many ways, from Nussbaum’s (2003) words of ‘transcending boundaries 
of class, gender and nation with narrative imagination’ to Benhabib’s (2008) notion of 
‘universalist norms mediated with the self-understanding of local communities’ (Benhabib 
2008, p.71). Hence, we have seen a shift in cosmopolitanism from an abstract 
cosmopolitanism from above (Nussbaum 2003) towards a rooted cosmopolitanism from 
below (Benhabib 2008). Still, the articulated theoretical problem of a dichotomy between 
universalism and particularism continues being debated within cosmopolitanism. Negotiating 
and reconciling universality of human rights with particularity of local, cultural values is one 
example of a presumed dichotomy between universality and particularity. Human rights can 
be seen as cosmopolitan ethics, a suggestion made already in 1998 by John Charvet (Charvet 
1998). 
 
What I aim to do in this paper is to explore empirically the supposed dichotomy between 
universalism and particularism by facing some allegations of Eurocentrism against the 
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drafting of the UDHR in 1946-48. When exploring the presumed dichotomy between 
universality and particularity empirically, I argue that the drafting of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights can be seen as occurring in a cosmopolitan space, where human 
rights were negotiated on conflicting, particular value grounds. Negotiating universal ethics in 
a space characterized as cosmopolitan has been discussed earlier by Charvet (1998) and 
Borges (2010). Both Charvet and Borges point to excluding boundaries of cosmopolitan 
space, in relation to power. The drafting of the universal declaration of human rights in 1948 
was a process including representatives to the UN Commission on Human Rights and 
members of the UNESCO Committee, hence setting strict boundaries of inclusion and 
exclusion in relation to political power. This conceptualization of cosmopolitan space 
contextualizes the tensions and conflicts arising in negotiating human rights, but also the 
temporal consensus on universal principles of human rights in 1948. By looking at the process 
when human rights were negotiated, as a relational, contextual and historical process, 
illuminates how universality and particularity can be reconciled temporarily, on conflicting 
grounds. 
 
The Impasse in Discourse on Human Rights 
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights from 1948 might seem abstract in its 
wordings, detached from any local contexts or values people relate to in daily lives. The 
first article of the Declaration reads, ‘all human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood’ (UDHR, article 1). When read and analyzed by European 
scholars though, the concepts of ‘dignity’, ‘reason’ and ‘consciousness’ have been 
interpreted as originating from western philosophy, and the term brotherhood has been 
understood in the light of the French revolution and ‘rights’ have been seen as deriving 
from the American declaration of independence (Griffin 2008; Ignatieff 2003). So even if 
the UDHR contains broad and inclusive concepts that give it a character of abstractness in 
the sense that there are no outright references to different religious or cultural values in the 
document, the UDHR has been read by western scholars through a western, liberal 
approach to its content.  
Within the discourse on human rights, the most dominant view today is that human rights 
need to be renegotiated in order to meet charges of ethnocentrism. Ignatieff (2003) argues that 
the process of drafting human rights was westernized. Although he admits that ‘many 
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traditions were represented at the drafting’, he concludes that western drafters played a 
predominant role in the drafting of the document (Ignatieff 2003). He said that there was an 
Islamic questioning of human rights already in 1948, when Saudi Arabia did not vote for the 
article on religious freedom (Ignatieff 2003). He chooses not to mention the other states 
represented in the UN Commission with large Muslim populations, who voted for the article 
on religious freedom, such as Pakistan, India, Syria, Egypt, Iran and Lebanon. Furthermore 
Ignatieff (2003) only mentions western drafters in the UN Commission, such as Eleanor 
Roosevelt from USA, John P. Humphrey from Canada and René Cassin from France, but not 
the Pulitzer Prize winner Colonel Romulo from the Philippines, or Peng-Chun Chang from 
China who was vice chairman of the Commission, or Charles Malik, Lebanese delegate and 
philosopher, or Hansa Metha, Indian legislator.  
 
The lingering allegation of ethnocentrism, according to Morsink (1999) is in part caused by 
the fact that very few people seem to know what was said and done during the drafting 
process. ‘This ignorance has led to numerous misconceptions about how the document was 
written and what it and its various parts mean’ (Morsink 1999 p.xiii). The UDHR has been 
criticized since its drafting as presenting ‘western values’. According to Tesón,‘what may be 
regarded as a human rights violation in one society may properly be considered lawful in 
another, and Western ideas of human rights should not be imposed upon Third World 
societies (Tesón 1985, p.878). Accordingly, Ignatieff argues against ‘faith in human rights’ 
and equalizes human rights negotiations with political debates, by bringing up challenges to 
human rights legitimacy today, such as dichotomy between Islamic values and human rights 
or East Asian values and human rights. ‘An Asian model puts community and family ahead of 
individual rights and order ahead of democracy and individual freedom. In reality, there is no 
single Asian model yet it has proven useful for Asian authoritarians to argue that they 
represent a civilization challenge to the hegemony of Western models’ (Ignatieff 2003, p.63). 
The claim of Asian values as not compatible with human rights has been debated by Xiaorong 
Li (2006) who writes that: 
 
‘The argument that rights are culturally specific implies that social norms originating in 
other cultures should not be adopted in Asian culture. But, in practice, advocates of the 
‘Asian view’ often do not consistently adhere to this rule. Leaders from the region pick 
and choose freely from other cultures, adopting whatever is in their political interest. 
They seem to have no qualms about embracing such things as capitalist markets and 
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consumerist culture. What troubles them about the concept of human rights, then, turns 
out to have little to do with its Western origin’ (Li 2006, p.401). 
 
The conflict in discourse is rather based on different conceptions regarding whether human 
rights are based on western philosophy and ideology or not. The ‘universality’ of human 
rights is criticized as a western concept, where particularity is understood as ‘other’ particular 
values than values deriving from ‘Christianity’, ‘liberalism’ and ‘natural law’. What is worth 
noting is that western scholars and philosophers generally argue against reconciling ‘universal 
human rights’ and particular values, by arguing that ‘other’ particular value systems than 
western, liberal values are not compatible with human rights.  
 
A cosmopolitan outlook on negotiating human rights in 1948 
When the UDHR is read and narrated in diverse national and local contexts, I argue that 
tensions may arise between different local interpretations of human rights based on different 
particular cultural, religious, political and ideological values (Andreopoulos 1997). I refer 
here to public or cultural narratives (Horsdal 2011), of what Gibson and Somers (1994) view 
as cultural, religious, national, ethnic and other group narratives, revealing the particular 
values in a specific context. This means that there could be stories in other parts of the world, 
revealing different contextual frames for understanding human rights values. Public or 
cultural narratives are collective stories explaining the events in our lives by evaluation 
grounded in particular values (Horsdal 2011; Gibson and Somers 1994). These cultural, 
religious and ethnic values are not subjective, but rather particular. If human rights are 
narrated within different cultural narratives where people make sense of cosmopolitan values 
in local contexts, do we need to find common ideological foundation for human rights in 
order to prove them universally reasonable? The abstract problem of the dichotomy between 
universal and particular values can be traced to an historical, contextual and relational setting, 
empirically grounded in the drafting of the human rights in 1948. ‘Historicizing’ the concept 
of human rights is a way to oppose the idea that concepts are a-historical and non-relational 
(Gibson and Somers 1994). The conceptual analysis explores a cosmopolitan space where 
human rights were conceptualized in different, cultural narratives by turning to primary 
sources of archived UN documents from UNESCO library in Paris. 
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UDHR - drafted in a Cosmopolitan Space in 1948 
The tensions in the world were strong after the Second World War. Delegates representing 
post colonial countries met in discussions with their post colonial rulers. Delegates from what 
would become the power struggle between the East and West block in the Cold War after the 
Second World War met from opposite sides of economic ideologies. Hence, the historical 
context for the drafting process challenged power positions, creating a possible conflict zone. 
It was the first time in history that people from all over the world met in a diplomatic arena, 
negotiating and discussing human rights from different ideological and cultural backgrounds. 
The working process of drafting the UDHR, engaging thousands of people in 194948 opened 
up what in this paper will be referred to as a cosmopolitan space. Was the process, as 
suggested by some scholars a process characterized by ideological domination (Ignatieff 
2003)? Was the drafting of the UDHR another postcolonial step of cultural imperialism 
(Griffin 2008)? Conducting an historical study of the concept human rights in relation to 
universality and particularity, enables an exploration of how universalism and particularism 
can be negotiated in a cosmopolitan space. 
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (henceforth the Human Rights 
Commission) held three sessions and over hundred meetings between 1947 and 1948 in Lake 
Success, Geneva and Paris where they discussed the content of the six drafts that would later 
become the UDHR. In the beginning of the process, the delegate who wrote the initial draft, 
John P.Humphrey from England, compiled all earlier works on rights he could find, from 
South America amongst others and when he presented this at one meeting, he was asked what 
philosophy had guided the Secretariat’s work. Humphrey had no answer to this question, ‘for 
the simple reason that the draft was based on no philosophy whatsoever’ (Glendon 2001, 
p.58).  
 
In 1948, 56 member states to the UN voted for the UDHR. The most prominent and active 
delegations on the Human Rights Commission, set up to draft the Declaration, were China, 
Lebanon, India, Chile, Philippines, France, England, Soviet Union and the United States. The 
old generation of countries like France and England, basing their attitude on colonial structure 
of the world, had to change their strategy of trying to ignore the smaller nations during the 
sessions. It took three weeks for the 58 delegates from all over the world to first negotiate and 
discuss and later pass two articles in the Declaration The pressure from a new generation of 
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human rights activists and advocates, such as Charles Malik, philosopher and diplomat from 
Lebanon, Carlos Romulo, Pulitzer Prize journalist from the Philippines (who was against 
colonialism), Hansa Metha, an Indian legislator and outspoken critic of Britain’s colonial 
policies and Hernán Santa Cruz of Chile, representing the economically developing countries, 
was something new in diplomatic relations. Charles Malik, the delegate from Lebanon had a 
crucial role in the passing of the UDHR and was elected president of the Economic and Social 
Council, to which the Human Rights Commission had to submit its draft Declaration. In the 
fall of 1948 he was elected chairman of the UN’s third committee (the Social, Humanitarian, 
and Cultural Affairs Committee), which had to present the Declaration for approval to the 
General Assembly at its December meeting in Paris (Glendon 2001, p.124). The two 
philosopher-diplomats P.C.Chang (Chinese delegate) and Charles Malik (Lebanese delegate) 
were by most accounts the intellectual leaders of the Human Rights Commission (Glendon 
2001, p.145). 
 
The process of debating and negotiating the human rights declaration in over one hundred 
sessions with delegates from all over the world resulted in the exclusion of particular values in 
the declaration since it was necessary to have everyone agree on the wording of the text. 
Article one in the UDHR reads today, 
 
‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. they are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood’ 
(UDHR, article 1). 
 
The lengthy process was partly due to political debates, but also to a great extent to different 
value systems being in opposition to each other. The Iraqi delegation agreed with the 
Communists that people are often born into unequal circumstances, which is why they wanted 
to keep Article 1 totally on an ethical plane (Morsink 1999, p.292). Adbul Kayaly, the 
delegate from Syria, wanted to retain the word ‘born’ as it would exclude the idea of 
hereditary slavery (Morsink 1999, p.293). The Brazilian delegation withdrew their 
amendment on reference to God, when the Philippine delegation took out their phrase ‘by 
nature’1
                                                     
1 http://archives.un.org 
.The representative from India, Mohammed Habib, said he ‘favored the use of the 
word caste rather than birth as the latter was already implied in the Article. This observation 
led several delegates to state their objections to both caste and class as not accurate 
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(Uruguay), as categories that ‘human beings were trying to outgrow’ (US) or as too specific 
(Philippines). Even though the drafting process was lengthy with endless debates on different 
wordings and its interpretations, this improved the chances for the UDHR to be more 
acceptable in a world of plurality. As Glendon (2001) writes, 'perhaps only someone like 
Malik, from a small, newly independent country, could understand how important it was for 
every member state to have a sense of ownership with respect to the UDHR’ (Glendon, 2001, 
p.143). The Chinese delegate to the Human Rights Commission refrained from proposing 
specific Chinese values such as good manners and consideration for others in the declaration 
and hoped that: 
 
[T]he others would show equal consideration and withdraw some of the 
amendments to article 1 which raised metaphysical problems. For western 
civilization too, the time for religious intolerance was over. Those who believed in 
God could still find the strong opening assertion of article 1 the idea of God, and 
at the same time others with different concepts (of human nature) would be able to 
accept the text (Glendon 2001, p.146). 
 
Since no delegation would vote for the approval of the UDHR if the human rights declaration 
was written according to one dogmatic ideology, compromises had to be made by excluding 
references to ‘natural law’, ‘God’, ‘Allah’, ‘Christian faith’, Marxism’ etc. The UN archives 
have documented these ideological debates between human rights based on religious grounds 
and political systems such as liberalism and communism. For example the Cuban delegation 
wanted to shape the UDHR more closely on the model of the Bogota Declaration adopted that 
April by the nations of Latin America (Morsink 1999, p.232). Watt of Australia liked the 
Cuban proposal that a ‘more prominent place should be assigned to freedom of conscious and 
religion’ than that of social and economic ones (Morsink 1999, p.233).  
 
The process leading to the drafting of the UDHR was hence one of excluding all reference to 
ideology and philosophical foundation and including an exhausting non-discrimination list for 
the right to human rights, listing different individual and group belongings; ‘Everyone is 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status’ (UDHR, article 2).  
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The UNESCO Committee on the Philosophical principles of the Rights of Man  
The UNESCO report from 1948 to the Human Rights Commission was a publication of the 
inquiry made by UNESCO of the philosophical principles of human rights. The UNESCO 
Committees report from 1948 exhibits different cultural, philosophical, religious and political 
interpretations of human rights than the dominant literature on human rights today. 
Philosophers from different parts of the world were asked to send written contributions to the 
UNESCO Committee on the Philosophical principles of the Rights of Man (henceforth 
UNESCO Committee). There were contributions on ‘The Rights of man and the Islamic 
Tradition’, ‘Human Rights in the Chinese Tradition’, ‘Human Freedoms and the Hindu 
Thinking’ amongst other. According to Chung-Shu Lo, who wrote the Chinese contribution to 
the UNESCO Committee, the idea of human rights was very old in the Chinese tradition, 
 
The term we use to translate ‘rights’ now is two words ‘Chuan Li’, which literally means 
‘Power and Interest’. This of course does not mean that the Chinese never claimed human 
rights or enjoyed the basic rights of man. In fact, the idea of human rights developed very 
early in China, and the right of the people to revolt against oppressive rulers was very 
clearly established (UNESCO 1948, p.185). 
 
According to this text on the Chinese tradition from 1948, human rights as a concept could be 
traced back in Chinese historical texts, suggesting that conceptually human rights reconciled 
with particular Chinese value systems. Through a cosmopolitan view of culture as dynamic 
and in constant change, the text does not imply anything constant in ‘reality’ but rather serves 
as an example in time on how universal notions on human rights were reconciled with 
particular values within a Chinese tradition, as conceptualized at that certain period in time. 
The UNESCO Committee also published a written contribution on the Islamic tradition in 
their report, by Humayun Kabir. Although the text is written in1948 it is written with a sense 
of increased cosmopolization and interconnectedness of people. According to the Islamic 
contribution by Humayun Kabir, human rights should be based on recognition of the equal 
claims of all individuals within one common world (UNESCO 1948, p.189). Even if there 
were divergent conceptions of human rights according to Kabir, the interrelation of people 
and global communication had marked the end of closed cultural systems, 
 
The first and most significant consideration in framing any charter of human rights today 
is that it must be on a global scale. In the past, there have been many civilizations but 
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never one world civilization. Two different conceptions of human rights could and 
sometimes did subsist side by side and because of lack of communication, could even be 
unaware of one another. Today such a state of affairs is unimaginable. Whatever happens 
in one corner of the globe has an almost immediate repercussion on the other parts. Days 
of closed systems of divergent civilizations and, therefore, of divergent conceptions of 
human rights are gone for good (UNESCO 1948, p.191). 
 
Kabir emphasized in his text the need of equal claims of all individuals in a common world. 
The contradiction between universal and particular was according to Kabir’s text due to the 
dominant conception of human rights as only being rights for European people.  
 
It is necessary to emphasize this because of one fundamental flaw in the western 
conception of human rights. Whatever be the theory, in practice they often applied only to 
Europeans and sometimes to only some among the Europeans. In fact, the western 
conception has to a large extent receded form the theory and practice of democracy set up 
by early Islam, which did succeed in overcoming the distinction of race and colour to an 
extent experienced neither before nor since (UNESCO 1948, p.192). 
 
Kabir suggests in the text that particular values grounded in Islamic tradition were in line with 
universal values of human rights and that an Islamic democracy could and had historically 
reconciled non-discrimination in ‘reality’. The tension or conflict in the text is suggested to be 
between practical inclusion of people who have the right to rights. The proposed conflict did 
not lie in Islamic values contra western values, but in the failure of practically including 
others than Europeans as rights bearers. The contribution from a Hindu perspective, by 
Puntambekar, presented a conception of the human being as spiritual, which may differ from 
a traditional western conception of human beings: 
 
Then we must note that there is an incalculable element in the human will and an endless 
complexity of human nature. No system, no order, no law can satisfy the deep potential 
demands of a great personality, be they religious, political, social or educational. No 
system can satisfy the growing needs of a dynamic personality (UNESCO 1948, p.197).  
 
Hence, Putambeker subscribed in his text to universal human rights, but on a different 
conceptual ground than the Islamic or Chinese value systems. If human rights may be 
reasonable conceptually within different particular value systems, then universal principles 
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could be reconciled with different particular values. But could human rights find a common 
ground in a specific value system, perceived as universally reasonable? The UNESCO 
Committees’ report exhibited antagonistic value systems, each and everyone subscribing to 
human rights in their particular cultural narrative. The process for the UNESCO Committee to 
analyze the written contributions from philosophical perspectives can be viewed as a process 
requiring a dialectical mode of thinking, by conceiving cultural differences as neither absolute 
nor necessary antagonistic, but relationally defined (Rizvi 2008). Studying the concept of 
human rights in a text below by Putambekar might at first sight be conceptually divergent 
from other texts in the UNESCO Committee report on liberal views on human rights. 
Putambekar writes that 'what we want is freedom from want and war, from fear and 
frustration in life' (UNESCO 1948, p.199). 
 
The claims for freedom in the text are similar to the liberal conception of rights, espoused by 
the contemporary American president Franklin D. Roosevelt, namely, freedom from fear, 
from want, freedom of speech and worship. According to Putambekar, ‘freedom is necessary 
because authority is not creative’ (UNESCO 1948, p.198). From a cosmopolitan perspective 
cultural differences are dynamic and interconnected, which implies that cultural narratives 
cannot be distinguished from each other on static terms, but they rather intertwine. In the 
words of Putambekar, the discussions on universal human rights were necessary but difficult 
since human beings were particular, as religious, racial, caste or group beings: 
 
To talk of human rights in India is no doubt very necessary and desirable, but hardly 
possible in view of the socio-cultural and religio-political complexes which are so 
predominant today. There are no human beings in the world today, but only religious 
men, racial men, caste men or group men [ sic] (UNESCO 1948, p.198-199).  
 
This situatedness in the world that Putambekar addresses as a great hindrance towards 
discussing and learning human rights in particular contexts is what Rizvi (2008) suggests as 
the point of departure in cosmopolitan negotiations. Cosmopolitan negotiations and consensus 
on human rights is according to Rizvi helping people to come to terms with their situatedness 
in the world, of their knowledge and cultural practices (Rizvi, 2008). Would this mean that 
people could identify themselves as human rights bearers if human rights were interpreted on 
a local level as ‘Islamic rights’, ‘Christian rights’ or ‘women’s rights’? In the report by the 
UNESCO Committee, different (and sometimes antagonistic) cultural narratives were related 
32  Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.4, No.2, 2012 
to the notion of universal human rights, even though the concepts of ‘rights’, ‘claims’ or 
‘human rights’ were not present in the particular tradition. Foundation for the same set of 
rights in divergent local value systems could be found, but when these same lists of rights 
were discussed and legitimized in another, seemingly antagonistic cultural narrative, conflict 
arose. The aim of the UNESCO Committee was not to find a common foundation for human 
rights, but rather to invite thinkers from different parts of the world to an open discussion on 
the philosophical foundation for human rights. The report the UNESCO Committee, with its 
particular interpretations of human rights, was not referred to in the UDHR, rather the UDHR 
text is stripped of any particular value reference. 
 
Common agreement on human rights based on conflicting grounds 
Human rights were referred to as practical principles in the UNESCO Committee. According 
to Jacques Maritain, French philosopher on the UNESCO Committee, the goal of UNESCO 
was a practical goal and he said that ‘agreement between minds could be reached 
spontaneously, not on the basis of common speculative ideas, but on common practical ideas, 
not on the affirmation of one and the same conception of the world, of man and of knowledge, 
but upon the affirmation of a single body of beliefs for guidance in action’ (UNESCO 1948, 
Foreword, p.II). 
 
The drafting process in the Human Rights Commission in 1948 aimed at excluding all 
reference to ideology in the final draft declaration in order for human rights to be understood 
in their local and cultural context, although orally the discussions and debates on particular 
values in relation to universal human rights were lengthy and ambitious. The UNESCO 
Committee, on their part, included all contributions from different cultural, religious and 
political regions in their report, to exhibit the different local interpretations of human rights. 
Both of these processes resulted in similar lists of human rights. The initial question raised in 
this paper addressed the presupposed polemic between local and universal aspects of human 
rights that extends beyond borders. The drafting process of the UDHR that included both the 
Human Rights Commission and the UNESCO Committee was held on a national level, 
between national delegates and invited thinkers from different countries. Even so, by studying 
the texts deriving from this drafting process, it occurs to the reader that the drafters, as 
individuals in a social context, went through changes in their conceptions of human rights 
from sharing their local and particular ‘stories’ or cultural narratives and by listening to so 
many other cultural narratives.  
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The significance of this paper lies in its illumination of the drafting of the UDHR as it was 
worked on not only by the Human Rights Commission, but also the UNESCO Committee. 
This highlights the fact that already in 1947 people from different political and philosophical 
spheres and geographical areas were preoccupied with finding universal foundations of and 
justifications for the declaration. If the universality and particularity could be negotiated in a 
cosmopolitan space in 1948, the consensus of human rights, however temporal, can work as a 
pragmatic response to the theoretical dichotomy of universality and particularity regarding 
human rights. Note that the aim was not to found one universal foundation of and justification 
for the UDHR. The work of the Human Rights Commission and the UNESCO Committee 
were two separate processes, ending with the same list of universal human rights. ‘Is there 
anything surprising in systems antagonistic in theory converging in their practical 
conclusions?’ (UNESCO 1947, p.7) asked Jacques Maritain in the foreword to the UNESCO 
Committees’ report. One insightful experience drawn by Maritain was that antagonistic 
theories and reasons for human rights could justify the universality of human rights, but not 
bring agreement on the foundation for human rights.  
 
Unesco’s part was to consult philosophers and assemble their replies. (…) Many schools 
of thought are represented, each of which brings to the whole its particular view and 
justification of individual rights (…). The paradox is that such rational justifications are at 
once indispensable, and yet powerless to bring about agreement between minds. They are 
indispensable because each one of us believes instinctively in the truth, and will only 
assent to what he himself has recognized as true and based on reason. They are powerless 
to bring about a harmony of minds because they are fundamentally different, even 
antagonistic; and why should this surprise us? (UNESCO 1948, Foreword, p.I) 
 
In other words, human rights as practical principles are reasonable within particular value 
systems, which are in opposition to each other. The problems in the foreground in formulating 
human rights were the supposed polemic between ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ values. 
Although, after the extensive political sessions and philosophical discussion between 
individual contributors from all over the world, the polemic was between different particular 
values systems, not between universal practical principles of human rights and diverse 
cultural values. As Jacques Maritain says in the foreword to the UNESCO report: 
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At one of the meetings where Human Rights were being discussed, someone expressed 
astonishment that certain champions of violently opposed ideologies had agreed on a list 
of those rights. “Yes”, they said, “we agree about the rights but on condition that no one 
asks us why”. That “why” is where the argument begins. (UNESCO 1948, Foreword, p.I) 
 
The discourse on Human Rights as a Cosmopolitan Space 
Cosmopolitanism does not imply abandoning our distinctive ways of living nor does it entail a 
sense of rootlessness (Hansen 2009, p.593). A conclusion can be drawn that understandings of 
human rights originate from our locality and through our particular value systems, with which 
we identify. Narrating our local values within a human rights discourse interconnects us to 
millions of others, rooted in their particular value system. Drawing on thoughts from Langlois 
(2001) the understanding of ‘universality’ can move beyond the impasse, of theoretical 
struggles of human rights legitimacy, towards reconciling ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ values 
in the cosmopolitan space that human rights offer as discourse. Langlois (2001) combines 
universal values with local stories, identifying ‘universal’ human rights as a language that can 
be seen as a common discourse through which cultural narratives are negotiated. Re-thinking 
‘universality’ from the imperialistic understanding of the concept, as the triumph of one 
ideology over another, to an inclusive concept, is useful for narrating particular experiences 
within a human rights discourse on a global arena.   
 
‘Preventing the discourse of human rights from stagnating around the old polarities: 
relativism versus universalism, individualism versus communitarianism, economic rights 
versus political rights, the discourse on human rights may thus be regarded as an entry 
point into the global community for the marginalized and oppressed’ (Langlois 2001, 
p.164).  
 
Taking the critical-ethical aspects of cosmopolitanism seriously is thinking the universal 
through the particular and acknowledging the tensions that may arise. ‘In thinking the 
discourse differently is to think it through the stories, narratives and traditions that define us 
as individuals and communities, rather than trying to avoid them’ (Langlois 2001, p.165).  
 
‘Avoiding the stories that define our identities means that whatever we are protecting 
with the human rights discourse will always be something that is slightly different from 
and out of touch with those things we value most. The issue here is how to use the 
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discourse of human rights as a means for telling our local stories to a larger audience.’ 
(Langlois 2001, p.165) 
 
Conclusion 
Ignatieff’s way of reconciling human rights universalism with cultural and moral 
pluralism is by arguing for a thin, universal theory of human rights as negative liberty. I 
argue that reconciliation of human rights universalism with cultural and moral pluralism 
has already happened, if one takes into account the negotiations and temporal consensus 
that was actually reached in 1948 on a universal set of human rights.  
 
The theoretical dichotomy between universality and particularity, as articulated in 
cosmopolitan literature (Nussbaum 2003; Benhabib 2008) has been questioned on a 
pragmatic level by looking at the drafting of the UDHR in 1946 – 1948. Approaching 
human rights discourse as a cosmopolitan space opens up for critical-ethical dimensions 
of pluralism, where conflict and tensions are part of understanding the relation between 
universality and particularity in regard to human rights. Claiming human rights as 
universal in 1948 through different and antagonistic ideological value systems was 
possible by the abstract wording in the UDHR. Dominant European narratives (Ignatieff 
2003; Griffin 2008) on the origin and cultural heritage of human rights in the documents 
have excluded alternative and equally justifiable philosophical and ideological 
foundations for human rights principles.  
 
By turning to primary sources from 1948 I have pragmatically questioned the lingering 
allegations of ethnocentrism surrounding the drafting of the UDHR. I argue in 
opposition to Ignatieff (2003) that the process of drafting the UDHR was not a process 
of western domination, but rather of negotiating and debating opposing and 
contradictory ideological, religious, political and cultural values systems in relation to 
human rights. When Eleanor Roosevelt concluded that east and west should agree to 
disagree on certain philosophical grounds regarding the nature of human beings, 
Ignatieff (2003) reads this as silencing. Whereas I read it as keeping conflict and tension 
open in dialogue – not having to reach consensus on every aspect of human rights 
foundation. 
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The UDHR became a document questioning the unequal power relations in the world; a 
common statement against oppression and marginalization of people, of migrants, of 
refugees, of noncitizens. The fascinating fact that such a declaration, for the people and 
against oppression in all forms, was possible when delegates from opposing cultural, 
ideological, political and ethnic perspectives met to draft the UDHR in 1948 has 
inspired this paper. Can this temporal consensus on human rights in 1948, as a 
cosmopolitan space, enlighten the discourse on human rights today and the presumed 
dichotomy between universality and particularity?  
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Figure 1: Reconciling Universality and Particularity in Human Rights Discourse 
 
Charles Taylor (1999) said that the concept of human rights ‘could travel better if 
separated from some of its underlying justification’(Taylor 1999, p.126). This paper has 
examined that empirically; separating the notion of universal human rights from its 
denotation with western values deriving from liberalism and natural law, by arguing that 
human rights found their philosophical foundation in different, but antagonistic 
philosophy and ideology, in the drafting of the UDHR in 1948. Hence, there is a need 
for further research, both highlighting more in depth the historical contributions of non-
westerners in the drafting of human rights 1948 and reaffirming universality of human 
rights in 1993 at the Vienna Conference. I agree with Ignatieff (2003) when he 
concludes that ‘a universal regime of human rights protection ought to be compatible 
with moral pluralism’, but I stress with this paper that it already is. 
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